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Abstract This paper explores the market structures of
natural gas and electricity as well as the interdependence of
natural gas prices and bids with increasing reliance on
natural gas as the penetration of renewable energy
resources increases in order to complement their intermit-
tencies. In particular, the paper will attempt to answer the
following two questions: What could the generation mix
look like in 2030 with a renewable-rich generation land-
scape and how could this impact gas prices? How do gas-
fired generator (GFG) generation volatility, their prices,
and their bids for gas change between 2015 and 2030 with
increased penetration of renewables? In order to answer
these questions, computational models are derived using
forecasting and regression analysis tools and an auction
model.
Keywords Natural gas markets, Gas-fired generators,
Regression analysis, Optimal auction model, Volatility,
Gas prices
1 Introduction
Global concerns over climate change as well as
increasing energy consumption necessitate a cleaner future
electric grid. Fossil-fuel based power plants emit tons of
carbon dioxide into the atmosphere, a primary gas pollutant
in the United States accounting for 82% of greenhouse gas
emissions. Environmental regulations like the EPA’s Clean
Power Plan aim to combat climate change by proposing
carbon dioxide emissions reduction by 30% by 2030 from
power plants. In order to achieve this, states across the
country are retiring coal plants and are seeking to replace
them with renewable energy resources such as wind and
solar power. Since the latter can be highly volatile,
increasing their penetration into the power grid calls for
quick, cheap, clean, and flexible back-up fuels to ensure
reliability. Gas-fired generators (GFGs) are sought after as
this reliable back-up fuel due to their flexibility, quick
ramp rates, and low cost. As a result, natural gas (NG) and
electricity networks are getting increasingly linked and
interdependent.
The electricity infrastructure consists of generators from
which power is transferred via long distance, high-voltage
transmission lines, with the voltage gradually stepped
down through distribution systems to the end-user. With
demand largely treated as an uncontrolled, exogenous
input, electric utilities have an assumed ‘obligation to
serve’ in which generation needs to be operated to meet
this exogenous load demand at all times [1]. This balance
between supply and demand is typically carried out by
independent system operators. The NG network is quite
similar to the electricity network, in terms of the network
topology—it consists of transmission (pipelines), producers
(wells), storage, and consumers. Pipelines use compressors
along the line to create the flow of NG from the injection
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point on the line to the consumer of the NG. NG marketers,
facilitate movement of NG by coordinating the sale of gas
quantity and pipeline capacity contracts.
Significant differences exist between electricity markets
and gas markets in the United States. Though both markets
have been deregulated, their structures are quite distinct. In
deregulated electricity markets, the supply of electricity is
organized through a day-ahead and real-time market, with
the former operating on a 24-hour time-scale and the latter
clearing anywhere between 5 and 15 minutes depending on
the geographical location. At the wholesale level, a cen-
tralized balancing authority such as the ISO supervises the
operation of these markets. And in each market, the offers
made and schedules posted depend significantly on the
availability of power generation as well as electricity
demand. On the natural gas side, there are capacity markets
and commodity markets, for buying NG quantities and
buying NG transportation, respectively. Market contracts
pertaining to the gas industry can be classified as firm or
interruptible. Firm contracts are long term and are typically
used by Local Distribution Companies (LDC). Moreover,
these contracts incur an additional reservation price which
pays off investment in pipeline infrastructure. Interruptible
contracts are flexible and typically used by GFGs [2].
Unlike the electricity market, gas markets do not have an
ISO but are rather deregulated entirely in which the spot
markets consist of bilateral contracts between the gas
marketer and consumers (utilities or GFGs obtain gas off
this market). Given the above significant differences
between the gas and electricity infrastructures, and the
growing reliance of the electricity sector on natural gas, it
is imperative that the effect of this reliance be explored in a
quantitative manner. The focus of this paper is thus to
examine how changes in the electricity sector, specifically
increased renewable penetration, impact gas market factors
such as gas price and volatility in GFG bids for gas. Tra-
ditional models of the electricity infrastructure and markets
have aimed to maximize net social benefits or minimize
costs across an optimized electricity network [3]. Research
investigations have examined the changing generation mix
including the impact of renewable generation on the elec-
tric grid as a whole and wholesale markets in particular.
For example, the New England States Committee on
Electricity, or NESCOE, explored the impacts of various
scenarios of increased renewable capacity on the electric
transmission in New England [4]. Econometric models
have been explored in [5, 6] to determine wind generation
impacts on electricity prices and price volatility, mostly
examining the merit-order effect that increased wind pen-
etration has on the grid. Reference [7] looks into the
relationship between wind power feed-in to the grid and
wholesale electricity price. In contrast, the focus of this
paper is to examine the growing role of natural gas within
the electric grid, especially in light of this increased
renewable generation, and how it impacts natural gas
markets and in turn wholesale electricity markets in New
England.
Of late, several investigations have been launched to
explore the coordination between natural gas and elec-
tricity in terms of reliable transportation, scheduling, and
communication, especially in times of peak demand. Much
of this work has explored the possibilities of shortages in
gas supply to GFGs due to transportation and pipeline
capacities. Some studies have addressed GFGs’ potential
need for firm contracts and how interruptible ones may
prove unreliable in times of peak demand due to weather
events, especially the polar vortex [8]. Traditional natural
gas modeling has addressed transportation models, invest-
ment models, and value chain models (see references in
[2]). Transportation models of natural gas analyze the
physical properties of the pipelines in a mathematically
tractable way and are combined within hybrid models to
analyze impacts on electricity power flows. Investment
models are used by firms for profit-maximization decision-
making of whether to invest or not in certain large scale oil
and gas power plant projects in different fields [9]. These
investment models are very important to analyze due to
greater discoveries of shale gas and future uncertainty in
production for future consumer demand. Value chain
models explore planning and operations of natural gas
pipeline and infrastructure, including factors like markets,
production, processing, transportation, and contracts; these
models are created to capture the liberalization or dereg-
ulation of the markets as well, while maintaining a physical
pipeline topology [10, 11]. Some previous work on natural
gas markets have explored the idea of the ‘‘contracts
problem’’ between producers and pipelines, as well as
buyers and sellers, to determine pricing of ‘‘take-or-pay’’
contracts [12], or have explored regulatory gaps and prices
with perfect and imperfect competition in the gas markets
[13]. Game theory has been used in some applications to
explore investments into natural gas [14], as well as to the
LNG markets and shipping of LNG [15].
Combined gas-electric models weigh the costs and
benefits of all players simultaneously within each individ-
ual network when determining the optimal set of natural
gas and power flows as well as prices. When studying the
interdependency between gas-electric networks, energy
security and reliability of the grid has been a focus; in New
England, there are two significant supply-related factors
that have contributed to shortages and high regional gas
(and therefore electricity) prices; first, deliveries of re-
gasified liquefied natural gas (LNG) from Northeast ter-
minals dropped more than 30% in 2014 compared to the
same time period in 2013 [16]. Second, the major interstate
and intrastate pipelines that transport natural gas into and
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within New England have been congested, especially
during the winter months and polar vortex. An expansion
of the pipeline system could alleviate pipeline constraints,
but the cost-effectiveness of these pipeline expansion
projects (which are passed on to consumers) remains dif-
ficult for GFGs and other parties involved [16]. It should be
noted however that most of these efforts have been directed
towards physical and operational interdependencies and the
modeling of the material flow and effects of pipeline
congestion rather than the economic flow and its impact on
the gas-electricity interdependence. The latter is the focus
of this paper, and seeks to examine the impact of the
changing grid on natural gas market factors such as gas
spot prices, as well as the impact on the GFG-gas marketer
transactions.
The goal of this paper is to explore how increased
penetration of renewable energy resources impacts gas
markets, the role of GFGs in general, and gas prices in
particular. Increasing intermittent renewable sources cur-
rently brings uncertainty to gas procurement, and increased
penetration of renewables will increase this uncertainty
even further. Uncertainties do two things: first, any
uncertainty in procuring gas increases gas spot prices.
Second, uncertainty increases risk for GFG-bids into the
gas markets. We quantify these two statements in this
paper, which correspond to the two main objectives of this
paper. The first objective is addressed via forecasting a
future generation mix to determine the impact of increased
wind and solar generation on gas generation and gas prices.
The impact that increased wind and solar generation has on
gas prices is addressed via a regression model. The second
objective is the quantification of the risk for GFG-bids with
a changing generation mix which is addressed through
these econometric models and a first price optimal auction
model. We explore within our model how volatility in
wind/solar (WS) generation can impact the gas market;
based on the results we explore some implications. Based
on the results obtained, we make a few recommendations
for how GFGs should participate in the gas market.
2 Forecasting future generation mix and gas price
The first objective of this paper is to develop a com-
putational model for variations in gas-based power gener-
ation and gas price with increasing renewable penetration.
To realize this objective, three scenarios of a changing grid
for 2030 are analyzed in which average annual renewable
penetration is increased to 10%, 20%, and 30% of the total
generation mix (as opposed to the current 2.5% annual
average in New England). The major assumptions are that
total electricity demand remains constant in each 2030
scenario (given assumptions of increased energy efficiency
efforts in MA by 2030), that there is no coal in 2030, and
that nuclear generation decreases in New England. Solar
and wind generation are forecasted via an Auto-Regressive
model [17] for 2030.
A schematic of the methodology that will be adopted to
meet the objective of this section is depicted in Fig. 1,
where Step 1 of the analysis is to create three different
potential scenarios for a future grid in 2030 given forecasts
and near future policies that may be in place in New
England pertaining to what extent each fuel may or may
not participate. To determine how wind/solar generation
impacts the rest of the generation mix and gas usage, three
scenarios are determined of potential increase in wind/solar
generation with varying percentages and how the rest of the
generation mix will change as a result. Step 2 includes
calculating the daily profiles of each fuel type to come up
with a total future generation mix. This is accomplished
using two parts, where Step 2a includes modelling and
forecasting the wind/solar generation time series, and Step
2b includes calculating the rest of the daily profiles for the
remaining fuel types in each of the three 2030 scenarios.
Step 3 will include the derivation of a gas price regression
model to examine how increased wind and solar generation
can impact gas prices.
2.1 Determining scenarios of changing 2030
generation mix
To predict scenarios of a future generation mix, it is
important to understand what policy changes may occur in
the near future and how they will shape the generation mix.
Table 1 depicts what the generation mix may look like in
2030, based on various studies for the New England area
[18–21]. As previously mentioned, it is assumed that nat-
ural gas is the main back-up fuel to renewable generation to
maintain power balance because it is the most flexible to
Step 1:
Create three Scenarios of varying levels of 
increased wind/solar generation in 2030
Step 2b:
Calculate daily Profile for each 
fuel type within the three scenarios 
based on wind/solar forecasts
Step 3:
Step 2a:
Forecast wind/solar daily 
profile in each future 
generation mix scenario
Analyze impact of current and future 
generation mix scenarios on gas price via 
regression models
Fig. 1 Overall approach used in objective 1 to determine regression
models for gas and electricity prices
Impact of increased renewables on natural gas markets in eastern United States
123
ramp up and down, and the least pollutant in terms of
carbon dioxide emissions into the environment [22].
Three different scenarios of interest are examined below
in Table 2. Given that renewable portfolio standards (RPS),
an environmental mandate requiring a certain percentage of
the resource mix be renewables, may vary from state to
state [23] and that wind/solar may contribute up to 30% of
the generation mix by 2030, three scenarios in which
wind/solar generation makes up an average of 10%, 20%
and 30% of the grid are considered. The scenarios are
depicted in Table 2 below where the percentages represent
the average percentage each fuel type makes up within the
generation mix in the year 2030. As seen in Table 1 above,
coal is expected to be absent by 2030 and is therefore 0%
in all three scenarios. Nuclear generation is expected to
decline, and is assumed to therefore be halved by 2030.
Considering that different policy drivers may impact any
increases or decreases in hydro, oil and other renewable
sources, the rest of the generation profiles in the mix are
maintained constant between 2015 and 2030. That is,
hydro, oil, and other renewable generation is maintained to
encompass on average 7.6%, 1.6%, and 6.7% of the total
generation mix in 2030 as it was on average in 2015.
Natural gas generation is the only source, besides
wind/solar, that changes between the three scenarios.
Natural gas is the fuel that makes up any generation gap to
meet power demand in the wake of retiring coal and
nuclear plants [21], and therefore is considered to be the
flexible fuel that makes up any gaps between power supply
and demand. The ramp rates of Natural Gas units are
currently of the order of 50 MW/min and are expected to be
even faster as we move towards the next decade [24].
This paper does not address scenarios in which gas
consumption itself increases, but rather into how the
volatility of gas demand will change should natural gas still
remain the marginal fuel and used not just for powering
peaking units. It is also assumed that the total electricity
demand is the same in 2030 as in 2015 with the daily
electricity profile maintained. This is supported by the
conclusions of [25] which show that ISO-NE predicts
electricity demand to remain the same in the next 10 years
due to expected energy efficiency efforts that are being
made by all six states in the region. Given the constant
demand in electricity, it follows that an increasing
wind/solar generation together with reductions in coal and
nuclear based generation naturally can allow one to con-
clude that gas generation itself may decrease. This is
because with increasing renewables, the supply stack shifts
to the right and higher cost units are getting displaced,
leaving the marginal fuel in some cases to be the lower cost
gas units. The regression analysis will shed light on the
correlation between these factors. Finally, we assume that
gas demand profiles (supply to the grid) will stay similar to
the current trend, with increased load during cold snaps.
We refer the reader to [26] for a deeper investigation of
varying gas demand and its elasticity.
2.2 Determining daily coal, nuclear, natural gas
profiles in 2030 scenarios
In what follows, we denote Xit;2030 as power generation
due to asset i in 2030 on day t, while X^t is a quantity that
corresponds to a predicted value of Xt. The annual average
generation in the year 2030 for each fuel type was deter-
mined for each of the three scenarios. The daily profile,
based off of these average generation values, was deter-
mined given each fuel type’s daily profile of 2015. That is,
Table 1 Expected growth or decline in generation mix
Fuel Growth Decline
Wind/solar 20% of generation mix (with 15% being wind, including off-shore
wind). This is part of 40% RPS by 2030 projected
Other renewables 7*10% of mix
Hydro 10*30% of generation mix by 2030 depending on policy
Natural gas 50*60% of generation mix by 2030 depending on policy
Nuclear Retirements of 17%*48% by 2030
Oil May increase slightly in dual fuel capability with gas
Coal Expected to be entirely retired by 2030
Table 2 Arrangement of channels
Channels Scenario 1 (%) Scenario 2 (%) Scenario 3 (%)
Wind/solar 10 20 30
Gas 59.2 49.2 39.2
Coal 0 0 0
Nuclear 14.9 14.9 14.9
Hydro 7.6 7.6 7.6
Oil 1.6 1.6 1.6
Other
renewables
6.7 6.7 6.7
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the overall profile of daily points for nuclear in 2030 is
calculated as:
X^Nucleart;2030 ¼ XNuclear2030 þ d1 ð1Þ
d1 ¼ XNucleart;2015  XNuclear2030 ð2Þ
where X^Nucleart;2030 and X
Nuclear
t;2015 are nuclear generation on day t in
2030 and 2015; XNuclear2030 and X
Nuclear
2015 are the average nuclear
generation in 2030 and 2015; d1 is the corresponding devi-
ation. It is assumed that XNuclear2030 ¼ 0:5XNuclear2015 , to be con-
sistent with the assumptions made in Table 1. Such a
construction allows one tomaintain the overall yearly profile
for nuclear generation and inter-day variance/volatility in the
future scenario as well.
The only two generation profiles that will change among
the three scenarios is gas generation and wind/solar gen-
eration, where the gas generation profile is dependent upon
all the other profiles as it is the supply to meet any
remaining demand on a given day. Therefore, gas genera-
tion is determined to be the remainder of any demand that
needs to be met on a daily basis, as below.
X^Gast;2030 ¼Dtotal;i  X^WSt;2030 þ X^Nucleart;2030 þ X^Coalt;2030

þX^Hydrot;2030 þ X^Oilt;2030 þ X^Otherst;2030

ð3Þ
where Dtotal;i is the total electricity demand; X^
WS
t;2030 is the
predicted wind/solar power generation in 2030 for any the
three scenarios described in Table 2; X^
Hydro
t;2030, X^
Oil
t;2030, X^
Others
t;2030
are the predicted 2030 generation values at time t for
hydro, oil and other renewables, respectively, are assumed
to be the same as their corresponding profile from 2015 in
all three scenarios; X^Coalt;2030 is the predicted generation values
at time t of coal, which is assumed to be zero. These are
summarized below.
X^
Hydro
t;2030 ¼ XHydrot;2015 ð4Þ
X^Oilt;2030 ¼ XOilt;2015 ð5Þ
X^Otherst;2030 ¼ XOtherst;2015 ð6Þ
X^Coalt;2030 ¼ 0 ð7Þ
Section 2.3 describes the forecasting process for X^WSt;2030
in the three different scenarios, and corresponds to Step 2b
in Fig. 1.
2.3 Predicting wind/solar generation in 2030
The historical wind/solar generation profile from 2009
to 2015 in New England is depicted below [27]. Our
observation here is that as wind/solar penetration into the
grid increases, so does the intermittency, or inter-day
variability.
Because the time series appears to visually have a
moving conditional mean and a moving conditional vari-
ance, an ARIMA-ARCH model (where ARIMA is an
autoregressive integrated moving average process and
ARCH is an autoregressive conditional heteroscedastic
model) can be fitted to this time series to observe if it can
predict and forecast this wind/solar generation time series.
Previous works forecasting wind speed looks to ARMA-
ARCH models [28, 29], further confirming this as a rea-
sonable model of choice for wind generation, noting that
wind generation is essentially proportional to wind speed.
An ARMA model more generally is a linear stochastic
model that has the form:
XWSt ¼ d2 þ u1XWSt1 þ u2XWSt2 þ    þ upXWStp þ et
þ h1et1 þ h2et2 þ    þ hqetq ð8Þ
where d2 is the constant that is a function of the time series
mean; XWSt is the current point or observation in the time
series for wind/solar generation; et is the error term; ui is
the autoregressive parameter that weight the lagged XWSt
values, i ¼ 1; 2; . . .; p; hi are the moving average parameter
that describes the lagged error term values, i ¼ 1; 2; . . .; q.
The error term is a stochastic process that is normally
distributed about a zero mean and a constant variance,
etNð0; r2Þ. Given the volatile nature of the wind/solar
generation time series, in principle it can be modeled as an
ARIMA-ARCH model. However, as our goal is to
extrapolate these time-series from 2015 over a long horizon
up to 2030 and beyond, we found that the ARMA-ARCH
approach led to significant errors. Therefore, we utilize an
AR(1) model, and estimate the mean and variance of each
time series and their trends over years based on actual data.
A visual examination of Fig. 2 shows that the variance of
the series is increasing even as the mean is increasing over
time. Breaking the total time series down into each of the
seven individual years yields Fig. 3.
Fig. 2 Wind/solar actual daily generation from 2009 to 2015 in New
England
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It appears that the yearly profile for wind/solar genera-
tion is similar year to year, but the mean and variance
increases show similar trends. That is, every year the
average generation seems to increase, and the volatility or
variance between the daily points in each time series seems
to increase as well. Specifically, the relationship between
the mean l and variance r2 of each yearly time series is
portrayed in Fig. 4 below.This mapping between mean and
variance is described by:
r2 ¼ 2:7299ðlÞ1:7109 ð9Þ
Hence, to create the wind/solar time series in 2030 given
that it will encompass 10%, 20%, and 30% of the gener-
ation mix, the variance is predicted given the mean inputs.
According to the mean and variance mapping above, the
variance is subsequently computed from their correspond-
ing mean values in the three different scenarios.
To create the daily individual time series points, an
autoregressive AR(1) process is fitted to the wind/solar
generation time series from 2015, and the variance of the
error term is calculated from (9). XWSt is assumed to be of
the form:
Xt ¼ aþ bXt1 þ et ð10Þ
Assuming that the error term et has a Gaussian
distribution with zero mean and standard deviation
sigma, the MLE method can be used to determine a, b; r
from the time-series data. MLE is the method of fitting
parameters to model a series of observations that maximize
the likelihood of those observations given the parameters.
It was found that for the wind/solar generation time-series
in 2015, a ¼ 7208, b ¼ 0:31, r = 3225. The resulting AR
(1) model in (10) is plotted in Fig. 5 and compared with the
actual wind/solar generation for the 2015 time-series. The
results illustrate that the AR model is successful in
minimizing the phase error, but not the magnitude error.
This in turn implies that the errors in the estimationof a and
b are small whereas the estimate of the variance is
significantly smaller than that of the actual time-series.
Given that the variance of the wind/solar generation is
dependent on many factors that may be unknown or
uncertain, such as how much capacity there is or what
programs or incentives are in place, such an under esti-
mation of the variance using our model may be reasonable.
In addition, it can be argued that at its worst, our model
provides an underestimation of the volatility in wind/solar
generation.
With the AR(1) model as in (10), we now predict X^WSt;2030
using (9) and (10), for each of the three scenarios in
Table 3 as follows. We begin with the mean l of X^WSt
which is computed in 2015 as l ¼ 7210:1: The mean of the
time series in each 2030 scenario equals the generation that
would encompass 10%, 20%, 30% of the generation mix.
That is, in the first scenario in which wind/solar encom-
passes on average 10% of the generation mix, the mean is
determined as four times the 2015 mean, as the wind
Fig. 4 Relationship between mean and variance on a yearly basis
from 2009 to 2015
Fig. 5 Actual wind/solar generation in 2015 and predicted time
series given an AR(1) model
Fig. 3 Annual wind/solar generation profiles since 2009
Table 3 AR(1) models for wind/solar generation per scenario
Scenario AR(1) model Error term
2015 XWSt ¼ 7208:3þ 0:31XWSt1 þ et et Nð0; 3224Þ
Scenario 1 X^WS1t ¼ 21; 735þ 0:31X^WS1t1 þ et et Nð0; 11487Þ
Scenario 2 X^WS2t ¼ 43; 470þ 0:31X^WS2t1 þ et et Nð0; 21070Þ
Scenario 3 X^WS3t ¼ 65; 205þ 0:31X^WS3t1 þ et et Nð0; 29806Þ
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generation in 2015 is about 2.5% of the overall generation
mix. Similarly, in scenarios two and three, where
wind/solar generation encompasses 20% and 30% of the
generation mix, l is 63000 MW and 94500 MW, respec-
tively, which corresponds to 700% and 1100% of the
current proportion of wind and solar in the generation mix.
Once l is determined in these scenarios, the variance r2
can be determined from (9). Also, once the wind/solar
generation is determined as in Table 3, (3)–(7) can be used
to predict the amount of gas in the year 2030 for all three
scenarios.
2.4 A changing generation mix
Assuming that AR parameter b remains the same over
the years, a can be determined from (10) as:
a ¼ lð1 bÞ ð11Þ
The assumption that b remains the same implies that the
time series correlation remains the same over the years,
which is somewhat reasonable. The resulting time-series
for all three scenarios together with the comparison with
the 2015 series are summarized in Table 3. Once the
wind/solar generation is determined as in Table 3, (3)–(7)
can be used to predict the amount of gas in the year 2030
for all three scenarios, which is shown in Fig. 7.
The results shown in Fig. 6 represent one of themain results
of this paper.That is, givengreaterwindand solar penetration in
the grid, the intermittency or variability of gas increases on a
daily basis. It shouldbenoted that this intermittency is predicted
by our model, even under the assumption of a constant elec-
tricity demand; if this demand increases as well, then the
demand for gas could increase even further, causing further
constraints on the gas pipeline infrastructure. These changes in
wind/solar as well as gas generation profiles over the three
scenarioswill beused in a regression todetermine the impact on
gas price. The 2015 data of daily generation from each resource
type was obtained from [27].
From Fig. 6 we can see that the wind/solar generation
and gas generation become more variable. We compute a
monthly volatility for wind/solar generation as [28]:
X
v;WS
k ¼
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
PN
t¼1
DXWSt  D Xk
 2
ðN  1Þ=N
vuuut ð12Þ
DXWSt ¼ ln
XWSt
XWSt1
 
ð13Þ
D Xk ¼ 1
N
XN
t¼1
DXWSt;k ð14Þ
where N is the number of the days in the month [30, 31].
That is, to determine monthly volatility, we are calculating
Fig. 6 Daily fuel generation mix in 2030 with wind/solar at 10%, 20%, 30% of the generation mix, compared with that in 2015 (shown top-left)
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the monthly standard deviation over the daily relative
change in value. Similarly, noting that the gas generation
time series is determined using the wind/solar time series in
Table 3 and (3), the corresponding annual volatility, Xv;Gasy ;
can be determined as:
Xv;Gasy ¼
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
PNt
t¼1
DXGast  D XGast
 2
ðNt  1Þ=Nt
vuuut ð15Þ
where Nt = 365, and DXt is computed as in (13) and D Xt is
computed as in (14) but is an annual average over daily
relative change. Table 4 shows the annual volatility of the
gas generation in 2015 and each of the 2030 scenarios from
Fig. 6.
Table 4 shows that when the wind/solar penetration
increases to 10%, the volatility metric more than triples,
and rises to even greater levels with increasing penetration
of wind and solar. With greater volatility in generation,
there may be a number of implications for gas prices and
the risk to GFGs in purchasing gas. We take a first step in
the subsequent sections and use a regression model to
explore some of these implications.
2.5 Gas price regression analysis—three 2030
scenarios
With the generation-mix profiles derived as in Step 1,
and the wind-solar generation predicted as in Step 2, we
now carry out a regression analysis to determine the rela-
tionship between the outcome variable of interest, which is
the gas price paid by GFGs, denoted as PGask , and the
explanatory variables it could depend on. Our focus is on
determining this relationship using monthly data over 2009
to 2015 as wind/solar generation started rising in 2009 in
New England’s generation mix. We identify these variables
to be X
v;WS
k ; the volatility in wind and solar generation,
XGask , gas generation, X
Storage
k , gas storage, and X
HHspot
k , the
Henry Hub spot price. The price PGask was assumed to be
the same as the MA gas price charged to electricity con-
sumers [32], due to lack of data for the other states in New
England. X
v;WS
k is the average monthly series as was
determined as in (14) using the data and procedure outlined
in Section 2.4. XGask is the average monthly power
generated due to gas and is assumed to be proportional to
the gas available to GFGs on the spot market. Data from
[27] and (14) was used to construct XGask : Storage levels are
considered as a source of supply, and because of our lack of
granular data for MA storage levels, we used NY storage
levels from EIA in [33] to determine X
Storage
k assuming that
they are similar, as geographically MA and NY experience
similar weather and may therefore see similar injection
patterns. Lastly, we include Henry Hub price from the EIA
as that is the hub that determines gas prices elsewhere [34]
to determine X
HHspot
k : All of the above yielded 84 data
points for each of the four time-series.
For the regression, we standardize each of the four
variables as x ¼ ðX  lÞ=r where x is the standardized
variable corresponding to X and l and r are the mean and
standard deviation, respectively, of the 84 data points over
2009 to 2015. The resulting regression model is of the
form:
PGask ¼ aþ b1xv;WSk þ b2xGask þ b3xHHspotk þ b4xStoragek
ð16Þ
The regression model was fitted to actual New England
or MA data from 2009 to 2015. The parameters a and bi
were then identified via a sum of least squares regression
method and led to:
PGask ¼ 5:28þ 0:90xv;WSk  1:37xGask þ 1:22xHHspotk
 0:09xStoragek ð17Þ
Equation (17) shows that Henry Hub spot price and the
gas generation explanatory variables have the largest
impact on gas price, which is not surprising. Also, gas
generation is inversely correlated with the gas price simply
because it is a reflection of the amount of gas obtained from
the gas network, with low deliveries during winter and
higher price, and high deliveries during summer and lower
price. That is, the inverse correlation of -1.37 is due to the
fact that GFGs purchase leftover gas from the spot market
and therefore prices are high in the winter with deliveries
remaining low. Implicitly, this accommodates the
congestion effects of the gas transmission network, even
though we have not explicitly analyzed the underlying
physical network and pipeline constraints. Endogeneity
between price and generation is not accounted for in the
regression analysis. That is, impacts of gas spot price on
any of the explanatory variables are not identified via
instrumentation.
The next dominant variable in our regression model is
the volatility in wind/solar generation x
v;WS
k , which
includes a regression coefficient of 0.90. As will be shown
later in Fig. 8, gas prices spike in later years when sig-
nificant wind/solar generation rises but gas generation stays
Table 4 Volatility of NG in 2030 generation mix scenarios
Scenario Volatility (X
v;Gas
k )
2015 0.9
Scenario 1 3.1
Scenario 2 5.6
Scenario 3 16.6
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relatively the same, indicating that wind/solar generation
can impact gas price; this is one of the main points of this
paper. This effect is discussed in detail in the next sec-
tion. The last term in (17) shows that storage effects are not
that dominant.
In Section 2.6, this regression model will be used in
forecasting gas prices given calculated and forecasted
explanatory variables.
2.6 Prediction of gas price in 2030 using regression
model
From the regression model in (17) we now predict the
gas price P^
Gas;i
k;2030, corresponding to each of the three 2030
scenarios. First, we calculate the volatility in wind/solar
from (3) and (12) and gas generation from (3), also shown
in Fig. 6. This gives us x^
v;WS
k and x^
Gas
k Henry Hub spot
price, x
HHspot
k , is assumed to increase from on average about
$2.63 in 2015 to on average $5 in 2030. This is based on an
EIA forecast in [35] which predicts similar increases over
the next decade in the Henry Hub price. We do not change
storage levels because, even though there are pipeline
projects under construction, it is under much debate on how
much additional capacity is necessary [36]. In addition, line
pack operates at its maximum and there is very little of it in
New England that can be used as additional supply in times
of high constraints and peak demand. Also, MA has been
focusing on energy efficiency initiatives and may not
require additional pipelines [37]. These resulted in the
following computational model for the gas price for Sce-
nario 1.
P^Gask ¼ 5:28þ 0:90x^v;WSk  1:37x^Gask þ 1:22x^HHspotk
 0:09xStoragek ð18Þ
Similar regression models can be derived for Scenarios
2 and 3 as well. Details of how these predicted quantities
were calculated are shown in Appendix A.
Figure 7 shows P^Gask;2030 for each scenario where k is the
observation on a monthly basis. We compare these prices
with the average gas-price profile over the years
2009*2015. From (18), we can make the following
important observation: when wind/solar generation
accounts for on average 10%, 20% or 30% of the genera-
tion mix, the annual average gas price decreases by 29% in
Scenario 1, and increases by 10% and 31% in Scenarios 2
and 3, respectively. The average gas price paid by electric
consumers in MA between 2009 and 2015 was 5.72 $/tcf.
This drops to $4.05 in scenario 1, but increases on average
to $6.31 and $7.49 in Scenarios 2 and 3, respectively.
The next observation that we make from Fig. 8 is that
the predicted gas prices do not follow the seasonal trends
observed over 2009*2015. This could be because of two
reasons:  we do not include pipeline congestion factors,
which are more likely to occur in winter; ` we do not take
into account fluctuations in gas demand for heating. Both
of these reasons can cause prices to increase in winter due
to scarcity of gas and to fall in the summer due to abun-
dance of gas. Neither of these factors were included in our
model since we had no data related to MA pipeline con-
straints and storage and therefore could not perform a
regression analysis with these elements. With more accu-
rate and granular data, we could get a more significant
relationship between these supply levels, leading to a better
regression model and a gas price which could reflect more
accurate patterns.
The decrease in gas price for Scenario 1 may be due to
the fact that the effect of the decrease in gas generation
overcomes the effect of increase in volatility. As we go
towards Scenario 2, the latter effect may be stronger than
the former, contributing to an increase; this trend continues
as we move towards Scenario 3.
Fig. 7 Average gas prices from 2009 to 2015 and predicted gas
prices in 2030 scenarios
Fig. 8 Normalized values of volatility in wind/solar generation,
volatility in gas generation, and gas price from 2009 to 2015
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We also note that we only account for generation here.
Even though less gas may be generated for the grid, with
greater intermittent capacity coming online, more reliable
capacity, or flexible gas capacity, will need to be available
in times of great intermittency. This can be explained as
follows. On a particular day, if wind/solar based generation
is not available, and GFG is required, as this is the low cost
flexible fuel, then GFGs need to be ready to make up the
difference. Therefore, with greater wind/solar capacity
committed to the grid, greater gas capacity or supply needs
to be committed as well. This can also be corroborated by
the current data from 2009*2015, shown in Fig. 8. While
the variability in wind/solar increased, the variability in gas
generation fluctuated within a particular range; however,
gas prices spiked significantly over the years as wind/solar
generation increased. Our model in (18) essentially implies
that, if pipeline construction continues to lag behind
wind/solar build out [38, 39], then this trend could continue
as we move towards 2030 with further increases in gas
prices.
Section 3 discusses how changes in gas price can impact
the gas bids of GFGs in the gas spot market.
3 Optimal auction model to analyze GFG bids
in NG markets
The second objective of this paper is to analyze how
increased levels of wind/solar penetration impact GFG bids
in the gas spot markets. In particular, we will take results
obtained in Section 2 regarding the changed generation
mix in the three scenarios in Fig. 7 as well as results from
the gas regression model and evaluate their impact on gas
bids. An optimal auction model is used to simulate the
bilateral transactions on the natural gas spot markets.
Inputs into the model include gas generation in the three
scenarios, gas capacity on the spot market, and valuation
for gas (spark spread determined by the difference between
electricity price and forecasted gas price from the regres-
sion model). The main output of interest is the daily bids
for gas. Gas bids are examined when GFGs bid on the spot
market.
3.1 Problem formulation
The three main inputs into the model are gas plant
valuation, gas plant demand, and gas plant capacity. The
gas plant valuation in this paper is the difference between
electricity price and gas price. The actual monthly gas and
electricity prices from 2015 were used to determine the
monthly valuation, vk;2015 in (19). The gas price prediction
from the regression relations in (18) in Section 2 are used
to determine the valuation in (20).
vk;2015 ¼
PEk;2015  PGask;2015 P^Gask;2015\PEk;2015
0 P^
Gas
k;2015PEk;2015
(
ð19Þ
vk;2030 ¼ P^
E
k;2030  P^Gask;2030 P^Gask;2030\P^Ek;2030
0 P^Gask;2030 P^Ek;2030
(
ð20Þ
where P^Ek;2030 is on average assumed to be the same as the
profile of the electricity prices over 2009 to 2015, but
scaled down to maintain an average price of about 42 $/
MWh, instead of about 48 $/MWh (the former was the
average electricity price in 2015 while the latter was the
average price between 2009 and 2015 in MA). We do not
project increased levels of electricity prices, unlike the
projected average increase of 10% to 31% in the second
and third scenarios of the gas price. This is because greater
wind and solar buildout as well as increased volatility in
gas-based generation may lead to higher-cost gas plants not
getting dispatched. Energy efficiency programs also con-
tribute to possible reduction in electricity prices. These
reductions can offset any increase in the electricity price
that may keep pace with the projected increase in gas price
from our results in Section 2.6.
These monthly valuations in (19) and (20) are converted
into daily valuations vt, which serve as inputs into the
auction model. That is, the average valuation over a par-
ticular month is used as the valuation on every day of that
month. To differentiate between the daily values within a
month, as well as the valuation between the two bidders in
the model, a random variable with a Normal distribution
between 0 and 1 is subtracted from the valuation of each
day. This accounts for any noise on a particular day that
can account for variation in pricing and valuation. The
second input, gas demand, comes from XGast;2015 and X^
Gas
t;2030 in
(3) in each of the three scenarios. That is,
dt;2015 ¼ XGast;2015 ð21Þ
dt;2030 ¼ X^Gast;2030 ð22Þ
The third input into the auction model is the capacity
available to the GFGs on the spot market and is determined
by assuming GFGs have unequal access to the spot market.
As mentioned in the introduction, consumers who hold firm
contracts on the gas markets have first priority in their bids
for gas as well as for any overtaking of gas on the
secondary markets. On a daily basis, the SRCM values for
each observation t are determined by:
ct ¼ Cp;t  ctDLDC;t ð23Þ
ct ¼
DLDC;t
DLDC;season
ð24Þ
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where ct is the capacity of the SRCM at t; Cp;t is the overall
pipeline capacity at t, (algonquin pipeline through MA
assumed in this problem formulation); DLDC;t is the LDC
demand at t; ct is the parameter representing the propor-
tional fraction of how much an LDC may overtake from the
secondary market. The data to compute the capacity ct was
obtained from Algonquin deliveries into MA [40]. We
maintain the daily capacities to be the same between 2015
and 2030 due to predictions of slow to no pipeline growth
in the MA area [37].
Figure 9 depicts the inputs and outputs into the optimal
auction model. The inputs and outputs show two each to
represent the two bidders (GFGs) represented in our model.
A mechanism design of an optimal auction model consists
of a valuation structure for each bidder in the market where
each bidder has a private value for gas at each day t. For
these two bidders at a certain time t, their bidding values
are denoted as v1 and v2. Each valuation is translated into a
bid b1 and b2 based upon an optimal bidding strategy that is
determined from a Bayesian-Nash equilibrium for the
resulting game (transaction between gas marketer and
GFGs).
To start, we examine the optimal auction from the per-
spective of the gas marketer where the gas marketer, or
seller, aims to maximize his or her revenue when there are
two bidders (GFGs). The gas is not considered a divisible
good, but rather multiple indivisible goods where the
‘‘entire’’ good is given to the bidder with the highest val-
uation (their demand entirely met) and the next highest
valuation satisfied with the remaining ‘‘second indivisible
good’’ which is essentially the remaining gas [13, 41].
Once the bids bi are transmitted, the gas marketer deter-
mines how to allocate the gas to each player based upon
their bids.
In order to determine the bidding procedure, we first
compute the marginal revenue to the marketer who is the
seller. If the seller offers the buyer a take-it-or-leave-it
contract at a particular price of x, and F xð Þ is the cumu-
lative distribution function of x, then the probability that
the buyer accepts this offer is 1 F xð Þ, which represents
the probability that the value for gas exceeds x: Hence if we
set x ¼ vi, the valuation of gas, and interpret vi as the
‘‘price’’ then q við Þ ¼ 1 F við Þ can be viewed as the
demand curve, with the total revenue R given by viq við Þ.
From the total revenue, one can determine Qi, or the
probability of allocation of gas, as the marginal revenue;
that is, any buyer that is willing to pay higher has a higher
probability of getting allocated their gas demands and will
yield a higher marginal value to the gas seller. We there-
fore can compute the probability of allocation of gas Qi as:
Qi ¼ dR
dq
¼ vi þ qðviÞ dvi
dq
ð25Þ
Qi ¼ vi  1 FðviÞ
f ðviÞ ð26Þ
where f ðviÞ is the corresponding density function [41].
That is, (26) implies that as vi increases, Qi increases as
well.
Once the probability of allocation is determined as in
(26), the actual allocation, qi, is determined as follows. If
bidder 1 yields the larger marginal revenue, he will get al-
located the minimum of his entire demand, or total supply
available, So. If bidder 2 yields the smaller marginal rev-
enue, he gets whatever gas supply is left over. This is
compactly expressed below in (25).
q1 ¼ min So; d1ð Þ if Q1[Q2max 0; So  d2ð Þ if Q1\Q2
	
ð27Þ
That is, if the bids are such that the corresponding vi
leads to Qi greater than Qj; then bidder i gets full gas
allocated.
However, marketers do not know the bidders’ valuation
function vi but only the bids bi. We therefore pose the
following maximization problem in order to determine the
optimal bid, which in turn leads the bidder towards winning
the auction.
max
bi
FðviÞðvi  bÞ ð28Þ
The optimal bid needs to be such that the total cost that
is being maximized is the product of the probability of
getting the bidder i’s gas demand met multiplied by the
corresponding utility or payoff that bidder i will get from
that gas allocation. Suppose we define the bid to be a
function of the valuation as bi ¼ b við Þ; the first-order
condition for this maximization problem in (28) is
therefore given by:
F vð Þb0 vð Þ þ f vð Þb vð Þ ¼ vf ðvÞ ð29Þ
The above ODE has the boundary condition, b 0ð Þ ¼ 0;
the player does not bid if the valuation is 0. With
f vð Þ ¼ ev, the following optimal bidding strategy is
solved.
bi ¼ b við Þ ¼
1 evi vi þ 1ð Þ
1 evi ð30Þ
Such a bidding strategy corresponds to a Bayesian Nash
Equilibrium in which there is an optimal strategy for
Auction model
v1, v2 (valuation)
d1, d2 (demand)
c1, c2 (capacity)
b1, b2 (bids)
q1, q2 (allocations)
Fig. 9 Inputs and outputs from optimal auction model for natural gas
markets considering two bidders
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bidders to bid into the market such that they gain no utility
from deviating from that strategy [42].
In summary, the auction model above consists of a
bidding strategy that GFGs can employ to signal to the gas
marketer as to how much they value gas. Given these bids,
the gas marketer determines, via the allocation rule ðQiÞ,
the probability of each bidder receiving gas and orders gas
allocation assignments based on highest to lowest proba-
bility. From this, the allocation qi is assigned based on the
bidder with the highest Qi receiving the minimum of total
supply or all of his/her demand as described in (27), and
the next highest bidder getting anything leftover.
3.2 Results for GFG bidding volatility
The auction model described in Section 3.1 assumed the
same valuation for both bidders because both bidders were
assigned the same price difference in electricity and gas
prices. Therefore, to obtain slight variation between them,
and also to account for any noise that can occur in prices,
we simulated their valuation v1 and v2 on day t by sub-
tracting out a random variable between 0 and 1 from the
valuation. The daily bids then calculated were a function of
these valuation terms. From bids in (30), the annual
volatility of the GFG bids is calculated as the standard
deviation of the time series bi over 365 days. Table 5
shows the resulting volatility of GFG bids at present, when
GFGs are on non-firm contracts in 2015. Also shown are
the volatilities for the three 2030 scenarios discussed
earlier.
The results in Table 5 clearly show that the volatility
increase of GFG bids increases from 2015 gas bid
volatility. It is interesting to note that as Wind/solar pen-
etration increases from 20% to 30%, the volatility increases
by two orders of magnitude from 0.002 to 0.1.
This in turn implies that with increasing penetration of
renewables, there is greater uncertainty for GFGs to
deliver and obtain gas and therefore they may be inclined
to bid even less frequently, or have more secure hedges,
in 2030 than in 2015. This is the main conclusion from
Objective 2.
4 Summary and discussion
This paper explored the electricity grid’s greater reli-
ance on natural gas through computational models depict-
ing what the future markets may look like, and addressed
two objectives:
1) To forecast and calculate future generation mix in
2030 for three scenarios of 10%, and 20%, and 30%
average wind/solar generation, and to analyze how the
associated volatility will affect volatility in gas
generation and gas prices.
2) To analyze GFG bids in 2015 and 2030.
The main results of this paper are that with increasing
wind/solar penetration:  volatility in gas generation
increases; ` gas prices go up on average, with a significant
increase in the summer months and a slight decrease in the
winter months; ´ volatility in gas bids increases. To
expand further, in Result , we observed that the annual
gas volatility increases rapidly from 1 to 16, from 2015 to
Scenario 3 in 2030 in Table 4, though the total gas gen-
eration goes down. In Result `, for these scenarios of
increased wind/solar volatility, no coal, and reduced
nuclear, the gas spot prices are predicted to increase by
10%*30% in Scenarios 2 and 3, compared to the
2009*2015 gas price average, or from approximately 5.72
$/tcf to 6.31 $/tcf in Scenario 2 and 7.49 $/tcf in Scenario
3. To further evaluate the risk, the optimal auction model
proposed lead to Result ´. In particular, as wind/solar
generation increases from 20% to 30% of the total gener-
ation mix from 2015 to 2030, the risk or volatility in GFG
bids increases by two orders of magnitude. The results
reported here are predicated on a number of assumptions.
Several other factors may change our conclusions.
Increasing intermittent renewable generation and capacity
the electric grid in MA causes risks in the way GFGs bid
for gas. There has been much discussion on the role of gas
in New England and its place within the grid. While it is
undeniable that gas is the most reliable flexible fuel in
times of intermittency, it might become costly if infras-
tructure cannot keep pace with demand. As discussed,
while gas supply to the grid may decrease, additional gas
capacity is necessary because there will be frequent
occurrences when wind/solar cannot produce and gas has to
step in in order to make up the greater difference. In order
to facilitate this additional gas capacity, a suitable infras-
tructure needs to be in place to ensure smooth deliveries
with minimal pipeline constraints; and to pay for this extra
infrastructure, costs will have to be passed to electric rate
payers and that could increase prices. Modeling of the
capacity markets, however, is not addressed in this
paper.
Table 5 Average volatility in GFG bids
Scenario Volatility
2015 *0
Scenario 1 (2.5 to 10%) *0
Scenario 2 (2.5 to 20%) 0.002
Scenario 3 (2.5 to 30%) 0.1
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Additional work will need to be done to account for
tradeoffs in costs between different initiatives within the
grid. That is, if additional pipelines are to be built, what is
the additional cost of this pipeline versus securing relia-
bility for the grid a different way? Would it still be worth
paying high costs in the winter over securing firm contracts
that can help build pipeline infrastructure?
Much greater pipeline infrastructure implies greater
CAPEX that can be passed onto electric-ratepayers in the
form of mandating firm contracts, etc. This is still up for
contention and debate. There are different contracts GFGs
could perhaps have that are not as expensive as firm con-
tracts (but less expensive than what they would have to pay
for continued non-firm contracts on the spot market). This
could include deals between GFGs and renewable sources
who rely on GFGs to produce for reliability. If wind/solar
generators fail to produce according to the capacity market,
they could use transactions with GFGs as a way to hedge
their own penalties and help GFGs reliably pay for gas.
New initiatives and cost-cutting and energy saving
measures have not been included here. For instance, given
the recent impetus to pass a storage mandate in MA,
storage in MA could contain 600*1766 MW of energy by
2020 [43]. This can mean less volatility in wind/solar
generation which would cause less volatility in gas gen-
eration. In this case, there would be more certainty in gas
procurement and less need for supply with less need to
alleviate congestion in the gas network. Technology use
could be optimized based on lower CAPEX between gas
pipelines and energy storage.
The results reported here can be viewed as a first step to
link the volatility in wind/solar generation to prices, gen-
eration, and volatility in the natural gas based generation.
We have obtained these results using simple regression
models and an optimal auction model derived under a
number of simplifying assumptions. Significant work
remains to improve these models, relax the assumptions,
and obtain more accurate predictions so as to better design
a natural gas infrastructure that makes full use of a
renewable-rich electricity infrastructure. In addition, while
the scope of the paper has been on market models for the
New England region in the United States, the same models
can be used for other regions of the world as well. The
exact results and conclusions however will depend on the
weather, the structure of the gas market, and the avail-
ability of various assets that will complement renewables
for power generation.
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Appendix A
We show the explanatory variables in the prediction
model (18) were derived. d1 and dt are the first and last day
of month t, with N days. lZ and rZ are mean and standard
deviation of variable z:
Wind/solar volatility:
xv;WSt ¼
X
v;WS
t  lv;WS
rv;WS
ðA1Þ
z^v;WSt ¼
1
N
Xk¼dt
k¼d1
X^
v;WS
k ðA2Þ
x^v;WSt ¼
z^
v;WS
t  lv;WS
rv;WS
ðA3Þ
Gas generation:
xGast ¼
XGast  lGas
rgas
ðA4Þ
z^Gast ¼
1
N
Xk¼dt
k¼d1
X^Gask ðA5Þ
x^Gast ¼
z^Gast  lGas
rGas
ðA6Þ
Henry Hub spot price:
z^HHspott ¼ zHHspott  lHHspot
 þ 5 ðA7Þ
where lHHspot ¼ 2:63, x^HHspott ¼ z^
HHspot
t lHHspot
rHHspot .
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